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The current paper reviewed two widely used approaches to assessing construct 
stability over two time points (rank-order and mean-level consistency), as well as 
common misconceptions about what each indicates.  In addition, the application of 
longitudinal mean and covariance structures (LMACS) analysis as a modern approach to 
assessing construct stability was explained and demonstrated by assessing the stability of 
psychological entitlement over 1.5 years measured via the Psychological Entitlement 
Scale (PES).   
Confirmatory factor analysis supported a one-factor solution for the PES at both 
time points, and reliability of scores was adequate (ω = .88 and .89).  Full configural and 
metric invariance and partial scalar invariance were established for the PES.  Rank-order 
consistency of factor scores was moderate (r = .61) and the latent mean difference in 
psychological entitlement across time was not statistically significant.   
Results provided construct validity evidence for the PES regarding measurement 
invariance and also indicated that psychological entitlement tended to be stable on 
average but not at the individual level over 1.5 years.  Discussion of the effects of 
differential item functioning (DIF) of scalar non-invariant items on mean difference 
testing and use of the PES with observed scores, the change in psychological entitlement 
at the individual level, and the advantages of LMACS analysis as a unified approach to 





Assessing the Stability of a Construct over Two Time Points 
Definition of longitudinal stability.  A fair amount of psychological research has 
focused on studying psychological constructs over time.  Developmental psychologists, 
for example, often measure constructs multiple times throughout a person‟s life, from 
early childhood, through adolescence, to adulthood.  One of the reasons researchers are 
interested in studying constructs over time is to assess how constructs of interest change 
and evolve (Chan, 1998).  That is, researchers are often interested in whether scores 
representing a construct remain stable over time (McCrae, Terracciano, & Khoury, 2007).  
Longitudinal or temporal stability of a construct is essentially the lack of change in the 
construct over time. 
How is longitudinal stability typically evaluated?  The evaluation of 
longitudinal stability usually involves a repeated measures design, whereby data 
representing the construct of interest are collected from the same sample of participants at 
least twice, allowing a certain amount of time to lapse in between the data collection 
occasions (Chan, 1998).  The amount of time between data collection occasions varies 
and is determined by the researchers based on the construct under study.  With a paired 
set of scores from just two time points, researchers often evaluate longitudinal stability in 
one of two ways.   
One method used to assess longitudinal stability is to compute the Pearson 
product moment correlation coefficient between scores from Time 1 and Time 2.  The 




points is often called test-retest consistency and indicates the stability of the rank order of 
scores across time (i.e., rank-order consistency).  That is, a high test-retest consistency 
coefficient would indicate that respondents remained in the same position relative to 
others from Time 1 to Time 2, whereas a low test-retest consistency coefficient would 
indicate that respondents changed their relative position in the rank order of scores across 
the two time points.   
Another method of assessing stability is to compare the magnitude of the 
observed score means at Time 1 and Time 2 via a dependent samples (repeated measures) 
t-test.  If the difference between means from the two data collection occasions is not 
significantly different from zero, researchers often conclude that there was no (mean-
level) change in the construct from Time 1 to Time 2.   
Typically, one of these two methods is used to evaluate stability.  That is, either 
rank-order consistency or mean-level change is used to make inferences as to whether a 
construct is stable over two time points.  Unfortunately, simply assessing rank order-
consistency or mean-level change to infer construct stability can be misleading, in that 
the information necessary to make such an inference is incomplete (McCrae et al., 2007).  
Below, I review the common misconceptions associated with the use of these methods to 
assess stability.  
Misconceptions about the assessment of construct stability.  There are three 
common misconceptions with respect to the evaluation of a construct‟s stability over two 
time points.  First, a high rank-order consistency coefficient is erroneously interpreted as 
sufficient evidence for the argument that a construct is stable over time.  A test-retest 




scores on the construct is consistent from one testing occasion to the next (i.e., those 
scoring relatively high at Time 1 also score relatively high at Time 2, and those scoring 
relatively low at Time 1 also score relatively low at Time 2).  Consistency in the rank 
order of scores does not imply that the mean level of the construct remains stable over 
time.  For example, it is possible that respondents‟ scores increased over time (i.e., level 
of the construct increased), but did so by approximately the same amount (i.e., high rank-
order consistency).  Likewise, it is possible that respondents‟ scores decreased over time 
(i.e., level of the construct decreased), but did so by approximately the same amount (i.e., 
high rank-order consistency). 
A second misconception regarding the assessment of the stability of a construct 
over time is that the lack of mean change from one testing occasion to the next implies no 
individual change.  This misconception is equivalent to erroneously stating that lack of 
mean change across time also reflects high rank-order consistency.  Recall that rank-
order consistency indicates that respondents remained in relatively the same position 
compared to others from one testing occasion to the next.  Such consistency does not 
indicate the absence or presence of average change in the construct across time.  On the 
other hand, mean-level change on the construct indicates change in respondents‟ scores 
from Time 1 to Time 2 on average, but provides no information as to how individuals 
changed across time.   
To better illustrate the distinction between rank-order consistency and mean-level 
consistency, consider the following four scenarios (see Figure 1) when crossing rank-




1) There is rank-order consistency and mean consistency across time.  Thus, 
respondents preserved their relative position compared to others across time because all 
respondents‟ scores on the construct remained the same across time.   
2) There is rank-order consistency but not mean consistency.  Respondents‟ 
relative position remained the same; those relatively high at Time 1 were relatively high 
at Time 2.  Moreover, on average, scores increased or decreased across time, which 
would be reflected in a mean-level difference across time.  However, the average change 
does not imply that all respondents increased or decreased the same amount across time; 
this would only be true if the consistency in rank order was 1.0.  For example, if the 
average change across time was 5 units, and the rank-order consistency was 1.0, this 
would indicate that every respondent increased by 5 units across time.  As the 
consistency coefficient decreases from 1, this indicates that individuals change more or 
less than each other across time.   
3) There is no rank-order consistency, but there is mean consistency.  That is, 
respondents changed their relative position in the rank order of scores, but because some 
respondents increased and others decreased, there is no change on average.   
4) There is no consistency in either the rank order or average across time.  This 
would be the case if individuals changed over time (e.g., some increased, whereas others 
decreased; all increased; or all decreased) but by different amounts; thus, resulting in 
change on average (i.e., no mean level consistency), in addition to individual change (i.e., 
no rank-order consistency).  Recall that a mean difference indicates change in the 




respondents scores were “reshuffled” at Time 2 (as indicated by the lack of rank-order 
consistency).   
Despite the clear distinction between rank-order consistency and mean-level 
consistency, researchers often report either of these two very different indicators as 
evidence for the stability of a construct over two time points.  The four possible scenarios 
highlight the importance of examining and correctly interpreting both rank-order 
consistency and mean-level change when assessing stability (Chan, 2003). 
Clearly, it is important to avoid misconceptions about rank-order and mean-level 
change.  However, the third misconception is more fundamental and potentially has a 
more serious impact on the validity of inferences about construct stability.  Many 
researchers erroneously assume the measurement of a construct remains stable or 
invariant over time (Chan, 1998; 2003).  When tested, this assumption is not always 
empirically supported.  Moreover, in order to accurately interpret mean-level or rank-
order change, one must rule out change in the measurement of the construct over time.  
Below I review how these three types of stability (e.g., stability in measurement, stability 
in the average level of a construct, and stability in rank order) have been conceptualized 
in the measurement literature and how to assess each empirically when modeling scores 
from two time points.  It is important to note that empirically supporting any one type of 
change (i.e., change in measurement, change in average level, or change in rank order) is 
not necessarily better or worse than other types of change.  Instead, these are merely 
different types of change, all of which are worthy of interpretation (Chan, 2003). 




There are three indicators of the stability (or lack of change) of a construct over 
two time points: 1) stability of factor structure (no gamma change) and stability of 
measurement parameters (no beta change), 2) stability of average latent scores, which is 
represented by no mean change in the construct across time (no alpha change), and 3) 
stability of rank order, which is represented by a high correlation of factor scores across 
time.  Each of these indicators of longitudinal stability will be defined and the importance 
of each when empirically evaluating stability across two time points will be explained.   
Factor structure and measurement parameter stability.  Factor structure 
stability is the extent to which the factor structure underlying a measure‟s scores (i.e., the 
number and form of the factors) does not change from one administration of the measure 
to the next.  Measurement parameter stability is the degree to which factor pattern 
coefficients and intercepts remain the same or invariant from one administration of the 
measure to the next.  Both factor structure and measurement parameter invariance must 
be satisfied before one can evaluate the other two indicators of longitudinal stability of a 
construct: no latent mean change in the construct and high rank-order consistency.   
A popular framework for organizing some of the indicators of longitudinal 
stability is the conceptualization of gamma, beta, and alpha (ГBA) change 
(Golembiewski, Billingsley, & Yeager, 1976), where gamma and beta change pertain to 
factor structure and measurement parameter instability, and alpha change refers to latent 
mean change in the construct of interest across time.  A contemporary method of testing 
longitudinal measurement invariance and latent mean differences involves a multi-step 
process known as longitudinal mean and covariance structures (LMACS) analysis.  




Lance, 2000).  More specifically, LMACS analysis is considered an extension of 
longitudinal factor analysis (Chan, 2003).  This LMACS analysis approach will be 
presented alongside the gamma, beta, alpha change framework given that this invariance 
testing process simply explicates the specific models that are tested when assessing ГBA 
change.   
Gamma change refers to an inconsistency in respondents‟ understanding of the 
construct over time.  Gamma change has been defined as “a redefinition or 
reconceptualization of some domain, a major change in the perspective or frame of 
reference within which phenomena are perceived and classified, in what is taken to be 
relevant in some slice of reality” (Golembiewski et al., 1976, p. 135).  For example, an 
employee completing a communication skills inventory before participating in a training 
aimed at fostering those very skills may perceive communication skills as a 
unidimensional construct, but when completing the same measure after the training, s/he 
may conceptualize the construct as multidimensional (e.g., interpersonal skills, writing 
skills).  Empirically, gamma change results in a different number of factors or items 
representing different factors at different time points (Riordan, Richardson, Schaffer, & 
Vandenberg, 2001).  In a LMACS analysis, gamma change can be tested by specifying 
and estimating the same factor structure at each time point.  If there is no change in the 
number of factors or in the items serving as indicators for different factors at the different 
time points, configural invariance is established (Millsap & Meredith, 2007).  Given 
configural invariance, one can next examine if the values representing the relationship 
between the factor and the indicator (e.g., factor pattern coefficients) are equivalent over 




factors or items are representing different factors at different time points, then one cannot 
proceed to this next stage of assessing longitudinal stability because one would be 
comparing conceptually different constructs (Chan, 2003).  Thus, it is crucial that there is 
no gamma change (i.e., configural invariance is established across time) in order to assess 
beta change. 
Beta change occurs when the respondents‟ definition and conceptualization of the 
construct being measured is the same across testing occasions (i.e., no gamma change), 
but respondents use the response scale differently across time.  Specifically, respondents 
use the scale one way initially, but then they “shrink” or “stretch” the scale during 
subsequent administrations of the measure, thus recalibrating their use of the scale 
(Golembiewski et al., 1976).  For instance, beta change would occur if a respondent‟s 
understanding and level of the latent construct entitlement did not change across time, yet 
the respondent chose different response categories when responding to the same items 
representing entitlement at two time points.  Thus, the respondent‟s observed item scores 
change across occasions, even though his or her actual latent level on the construct 
remains the same.  In LMACS framework, such inconsistency is assessed via metric and 
scalar invariance tests (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000).  Metric invariance requires that the 
values of factor pattern coefficients (i.e., factor loadings) be of the same magnitude 
across testing occasions, which implies the items have equivalent saliency to the factor 
across time (Millsap & Meredith, 2007).  In other words, establishing metric invariance 
implies that an item is equally representative of the underlying construct at each time 
point.  At least partial metric invariance needs to be established before one could proceed 




requires that the values of intercepts (i.e., the observed item score when the latent 
variable underlying the item has a value of zero) of corresponding items be of the same 
magnitude across time, which means that given an equal representation of the construct 
by the items across time points (i.e., metric and scalar invariance), responses to the items 
will be equally indicative of the construct (factor) they represent (Millsap & Meredith, 
2007).  For example, given configural, metric, and scalar invariance, a person whose 
latent level of entitlement truly did not change across two time points should provide the 
same observed responses at Time 1 and Time 2.  By contrast, if s/he actually increased or 
decreased on entitlement (change at the latent level), s/he should respond differently to 
the items across time.  Thus, establishing both metric and scalar invariance implies that 
observed mean change is reflecting latent mean change.  That is, the absence of beta 
change allows the researcher to make valid inferences about latent mean stability of the 
construct, based on presence or absence of changes in observed scores over time (Riordan 
et al., 2001).  
Latent mean stability.  Given no gamma or beta change, one can assess alpha 
change.  Alpha change “involves a variation in the level of some existential state, given a 
constantly calibrated measuring instrument related to a constant conceptual domain” 
(Golembiewski et al., 1967, p. 134).  That is, the instrument measures the construct 
equally well from one administration to the next, yet respondents‟ scores vary across 
testing occasions (mean change in observed scores across time is present).  In the case of 
alpha change, a change in a respondent‟s observed score across time is inferred to reflect 
a change in the amount of the underlying construct across time.  Thus, by definition, 




Essentially, alpha change is what researchers are typically interested in assessing, 
and often this is assessed using observed variable techniques such as repeated measures 
ANOVA to estimate the observed mean difference in scores across time.  Fortunately, in 
a structural equation modeling framework, latent mean stability can be assessed via 
LMACS analysis by estimating the latent mean difference or the difference between 
means at the construct level across time (Chan, 1998).  Thus, LMACS analysis allows for 
the simultaneous estimation of latent means alongside the parameters analyzed for 
measurement invariance (factor structure, factor pattern coefficients, and intercepts).  
Moreover, modeling variables at the latent level accounts for measurement error in the 
indicators, and therefore estimates of mean difference over time will be more accurate 
than those produced by observed variable techniques which assume no measurement 
error (DeShon, 1998; Hancock, 1997).  See Chan (2003) and Ployhart and Oswald (2004) 
for a more detailed review of the advantages of latent variable techniques over traditional 
observed variable methods in longitudinal research. 
 Latent rank-order consistency.  Another indicator of the stability of a construct 
is high consistency of scores across time. That is, the degree to which the rank ordering 
of respondents on the construct is preserved from one time point to another can be 
estimated by computing a stability coefficient (i.e., the correlation of respondents‟ scores 
across two time points).  Rank-order consistency should only be estimated after 
establishing both configural and metric invariance (scalar invariance is not necessary 
because estimates of consistency do not involve means).  Researchers often report and 
interpret the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient, which is based on observed 




above, the correlation coefficient obtained from observed variables will be biased 
because of measurement error.  Alternatively, estimating the correlation between the 
latent variable (factor) at time 1 and time 2 will result in a more accurate estimate of 
rank-order consistency. 
Example of Assessing Construct Stability: Psychological Entitlement 
Understanding the process of assessing longitudinal invariance and factor stability 
is best facilitated by an example.  Below I demonstrate how to apply LMACS analysis to 
assess the stability of psychological entitlement over two time points, 1.5 years apart.  
Psychological entitlement is an especially suitable construct, given the current interest in 
the construct, the need to gather validity evidence for a popular existing measure of 
entitlement, and most importantly, the lack of empirical support behind the claims that 
psychological entitlement is stable over time.  
Definition of psychological entitlement and its importance.  An entitled 
individual is someone who has “unreasonable expectations of especially favorable 
treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations” (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).  
With respect to stability, a popular definition of psychological entitlement is “a stable and 
pervasive sense that one deserves more and is entitled to more than others” (W. K. 
Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004, p. 31).  This definition suggests 
that psychological entitlement is both stable and non-context-specific.  Indeed, one can 
encounter psychologically entitled people in many contexts.  For example, children may 
express a strong feeling of entitlement to Christmas presents, new toys, or candy.  
Teenagers, on the other hand, may feel entitled to privacy or attention.  Young adults 




first few months on the job.  These are but a few examples of situations where one can 
witness a clash of interests due to the perception of “due” favorable treatment by 
psychologically entitled individuals.   
Previous research has linked entitlement to a host of maladaptive attitudes, 
affects, and behaviors.  To name a few, psychological entitlement has been positively 
related to aggression, acquisitiveness, selfish behaviors in relationships (W. K. Campbell 
et al., 2004), job-related frustration and coworker abuse (Harvey & Harris, 2010), and 
negatively related to humility, focus on others (Elliott, 2010), agreeableness, and 
emotional stability (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004).  Clearly, psychological entitlement is a 
construct worthy of investigation.  Moreover, considering the multitude of undesirable 
attitudes, affects, and behaviors that psychological entitlement has been related to, it is 
important to empirically test the claim of stability. That is, if psychological entitlement is 
stable over time, then entitled individuals will most likely remain entitled throughout 
their lives, which negatively impacts other people.  By contrast, if psychological 
entitlement is malleable (i.e., not stable), experiences that lower levels of psychological 
entitlement could be sought.   
Evidence regarding the stability of entitlement.  Authors of the Psychological 
Entitlement Scale (PES), currently the most popular measure of psychological 
entitlement, claim that psychological entitlement is “a chronic or stable disposition rather 
than a response to a specific social situation” (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004, p. 35).  
Interestingly, the authors of the PES provide no theoretical rationale as to why 
psychological entitlement is stable.  In support of their claim of the stability of 




which the PES was administered to participants twice.  In one study, the two test 
administrations were 1 month apart, and produced a test-retest correlation coefficient of 
.72.  In the other study, the PES administrations were 2 months apart, and the test-retest 
stability coefficient was .70.  Based on this evidence, W. K. Campbell and colleagues 
(2004) concluded that psychological entitlement is indeed stable over time.  No other 
longitudinal research has been conducted to support or challenge the authors‟ conclusion.  
Thus, the empirical evidence supporting the stability of psychological entitlement is 
limited at best. 
Not only is the evidence gathered by W. K. Campbell and colleagues limited, but 
the interpretation of these test-retest correlation coefficients may be invalid.  Recall that 
in order to assess rank order-consistency, certain assumptions must be met to ensure that 
no conceptual or measurement inconsistencies affect the results; configural and metric 
invariance must be established.  W. K. Campbell and colleagues did not test these 
assumptions.  Moreover, in order to fully assess the stability of a construct, test-retest 
stability should be coupled with an assessment of mean-level change.  Although W. K. 
Campbell and colleagues reported observed means at Time 1 and Time 2, they did not 
interpret or discuss observed mean differences.  Of course, the computation and 
interpretation of mean change requires that the researchers establish configural, metric, 
and scalar invariance; these invariance tests were not conducted.  Considering the 
insufficiency of evidence regarding the stability of psychological entitlement, further 
empirical investigation is needed prior to making claims about construct stability. 




 Purpose.  The purpose the current study was to demonstrate the assessment of 
construct stability by examining psychological entitlement over the course of 
approximately 1.5 years.  The multi-step process of LMACS analysis was employed, as 
these steps align with the assessment of stability, which are reflected in the three research 
questions below. 
Research question 1:  Is the unidimensional model of entitlement championed by 
the creators of the PES empirically supported at two time points?  To answer this 
question, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted on PES scores collected at Time 1 
and 1.5 years later at Time 2.  Given the same factor model fit the PES scores at both 
time points, configural invariance was supported, and the analyses proceeded to the next 
stage (Figure 2). 
Research question 2:  Does the PES function equivalently across time?  Given a 
comparable factor structure at both time points, I tested for equal factor pattern 
coefficient values across time (metric invariance) and equal item intercepts across time 
(scalar invariance).  Based on these results, full metric and partial scalar invariance were 
established, and the analyses proceeded to the final stage (Figure 3). 
Research question 3:  Given longitudinal measurement invariance of the PES, 
does psychological entitlement increase or decrease over 1.5 years?  Because only partial 
scalar invariance was established, a test of the latent mean difference in entitlement from 
Time 1 to Time 2 was conducted using LMACS analysis both with and without scalar 
non-invariant items contributing to the latent mean to determine whether entitlement 
changes on average and to assess the effect of scalar non-invariance.  Moreover, using 









Review of the Literature of Psychological Entitlement 
The term “entitlement” was first used in the early 1800‟s in the context of legal 
affairs, pertaining to one‟s rights to social benefits as regulated by law or social norms.  
This original meaning has been fully preserved to this day, as we often hear people talk 
about entitlement programs (e.g., Social Security, Medicare).  What has occurred since 
that time is the emergence of a different, yet related term—“psychological entitlement”. 
The term “psychological entitlement” emerged fairly recently (early 90s), but the 
concept dates back to 1916, when Freud first labeled a group of patients, who felt they 
were special, “the exceptions” (Freud, 1916).  Psychological entitlement is different from 
the conceptualization of entitlement as regulated by law or social norms in that 
psychological entitlement represents a sense or expectation that one should receive favors 
and/or special treatment from others that entitled individuals deem reasonable and 
justified, when in fact they aren‟t.  According to Freud, these patients must have been 
wronged in the past, and thus they expect special treatment.   
Jacobson (1959) agreed with Freud‟s theory that these patients must have been 
wronged in the past, but he also added that individuals like Freud‟s patients perceived 
themselves as “blessed” with unusual beauty and talent, and thus, were not to be expected 
to adhere to rules like everyone else.  Horney (1950) labeled these expectations of special 
treatment “neurotic claims” and stated that for these patients “a wish or need, in itself 
quite understandable, turns into a claim” (p. 42).  In order to claim something, one must 
have a somewhat legitimate reason to make that claim.  A problem arises with 




expectations justified or legitimate, when, in fact, they aren‟t.  For example, a student 
may feel entitled to graduate from college simply because s/he was admitted to the 
university and paid tuition. Such an expectation is certainly not justified.  In comparison, 
an example of justified entitlement is public education in the U.S.  Every American 
citizen is entitled to public education, as regulated by law.  As such, justified entitlement 
is typically inclusive—justified entitlement pertains to everyone in a group defined by 
law or social norms (e.g., social security).  Unjustified or psychological entitlement, on 
the other hand, tends to be exclusive—psychologically entitled individuals believe they 
stand out from the group, they are special, and therefore they should be treated 
preferentially. 
Because entitled individuals are not isolated from others, these unjustified 
expectations affect others.  In the context of distributive justice, or justice as it pertains to 
the allocation of goods in society, such expectations may lead to a situation of inequity.  
According to equity theory (Adams, 1965), people experience inequity when they 
perceive that the ratio of their outcomes (e.g., salary, benefits) to inputs (e.g., effort, 
skills) and the ratio of others‟ outcomes to inputs are unequal.  Research on equity 
sensitivity empirically categorized people according to their level of tolerance to 
inequity: a) benevolent, people who prefer their outcome/income ratios to be lower than 
those of others, b) equity sensitive, people who prefer their outcome/income ratios to be 
the same as those of others, and c) entitled, people who experience distress when their 
outcome/income ratios are not higher than those of others (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 
1987; Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman, 1989).  The last category defines individuals who are 




pie are not justified.  Having established the distinction between justified (e.g., 
entitlement programs such as social security) and unjustified (psychological) entitlement, 
the origins and initial study of psychological entitlement will be reviewed next, since it is 
the construct under investigation in the current study. 
The Emergence of Psychological Entitlement as a Construct 
Psychological entitlement as a component of narcissism.  Feelings of being 
“exceptional”, “special”, and “unique” as exhibited by psychologically entitled 
individuals, also appear to be symptoms of a personality disorder that was given much 
attention by clinical psychologists and psychoanalytic practitioners in the last century—
the narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).  The interest in NPD granted the disorder its 
inclusion in the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association‟s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 
1980).  The DSM-III (1980) describes a narcissistic individual as one displaying 
“characteristic disturbances in interpersonal relationships, such as feelings of entitlement, 
interpersonal exploitativeness, relationships that alternate between the extremes of 
overidealization and devaluation, and lack of empathy” (p. 315).  According to this 
definition, psychological entitlement can be considered a component of narcissism.  This 
conceptualization is further supported by certain criteria in the DSM-III (1980) for 
diagnosing someone with NPD, such as “grandiose sense of self-importance and 
uniqueness, e.g., exaggeration of achievements and talents” and “preoccupation with 
fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love” (p. 317).  These 
criteria align with Freud‟s categorizing of patients expecting special treatment as the 




possession of unseen beauty and talent by such individuals (Jacobson, 1959).  Whether it 
is because narcissists believe they are simply “the exception” or worth more than others, 
they typically feel entitled to things: “Entitlement, the expectation of special favors 
without assuming reciprocal responsibilities, is usually present” (DSM-III, 1980, p. 316).  
This clinical definition of psychological entitlement is consistent with Huseman, Hatfield, 
and Miles‟ (1987) description of entitled people, as expecting more than they contribute.  
As more research was conducted on narcissism and entitlement, entitlement grew into an 
area of interest of its own, rather than simply as a component of narcissism. 
Psychological entitlement as an independent construct worthy of study.  Over 
the last couple of decades, interest in psychological entitlement has increased.  This rising 
interest is reflected in both the popular press and psychological research.  A 
Lexis/Nexis
TM
 (2010) search of the term “sense of entitlement” returned 831 results in 
major newspapers and magazines between the years 1990 and 2000, compared to over 
3000 results between 2000 and 2010.  The increased focus on entitlement has resulted in 
a better understanding of the construct.  For example, although entitlement is still listed 
as a criterion for the diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder in the most current 
version of the DSM (DSM-IV-TR), entitlement‟s definition has changed.  Formerly, 
entitlement was defined as “the expectation of special favors without assuming reciprocal 
responsibilities” (DSM-III, 1980).  Currently, an entitled individual is defined as 
someone who has “unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or 
automatic compliance with his or her expectations” (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).  The current 
definition of entitlement is different from the former definition in that the current 




idea of expecting special favors without reciprocating has grown into a set of beliefs that 
are “unreasonable” and involve “especially favorable treatment” and “automatic 
compliance”.  As such, the current definition of entitlement reflects a deeper 
understanding of entitlement among researchers, and more importantly, one that portrays 
entitlement more negatively than before. 
In addition to this revised definition of entitlement, conceptualizations of both 
general psychological entitlement and context-specific entitlement have emerged.  A 
construct that is considered general is not specific to any domain or situation, but is 
rather universal, manifesting itself in a wide range of settings, virtually independent of 
the situation.  By contrast, a construct that is considered context-specific is heavily 
dependent on the situation and is only typical of the domain to which it was specified.  
One will likely encounter people with high levels of entitlement in a wide variety of 
contexts.  At the workplace, for instance, an employee may feel entitled to extra vacation 
days or approval of late arrivals to work.  Such attitudes and behaviors are rarely 
tolerated, and can often lead to interpersonal tension or even conflict with supervisors and 
coworkers.  Another example is academic entitlement or “a sense of entitlement specific 
to education” (Kopp, Zinn, Finney & Jurich, 2011).  An entitled student may expect a 
passing grade in the course simply because s/he attended class throughout the semester.  
These are two different types of context- specific entitlement.  That is, think about a 
student who is working while attending college. The working student may feel entitled in 
one context, but not the other.  For example, the student may be academically entitled, 




Alternatively, a person may feel entitled across a variety of contexts, thus 
exemplifying the aforementioned general, non-context-specific entitlement.  General 
attitudes and affects are lasting beliefs, convictions, or viewpoints that are independent of 
the context or the situation at hand.  A person‟s level on a latent variable that is non-
context-specific should remain fairly similar in magnitude (i.e., intensity) and direction 
(e.g., positive or negative) across situations or contexts.   
It is important to study entitlement with respect to specificity.  That is, empirical 
studies of a construct at different levels of measurement specificity allow the researcher 
to examine the extent to which the construct is general, context-specific, or both 
(Baranik, Barron, & Finney, 2010).  With respect to psychological entitlement, research 
employing measures of both general and context-specific entitlement is very limited 
(Chowning & N. J. Campbell, 2009; Greenberger, Lessard, Chen, & Farruggia, 2008; 
Kopp, Zinn, Finney, & Jurich, 2011).  Nonetheless, in all three papers, general 
entitlement and context-specific (e.g., academic) entitlement are moderately correlated.  
Therefore, it is important that researchers continue to study general psychological 
entitlement in addition to context-specific entitlement.   
Justified Entitlement vs. Unjustified Entitlement vs. Deservingness 
It is important to clarify the differences between three related concepts—justified 
entitlement, unjustified (psychological) entitlement, and deservingness. Above, the 
distinction between justified and unjustified entitlement was established.  However, the 
introduction of the concept “deservingness” often causes confusion among all three 




In everyday language, the terms “entitlement” and “deservingness” are often used 
interchangeably.  For example, one may say “I deserve a raise” or “I am entitled to a 
raise”.  Both statements convey one‟s expectation of a higher salary in the future.  
However, there are conceptual differences as to whether one is said to be “deserving of” 
something, or to be “entitled to” something.  Moreover, recall that entitlement can be 
justified (e.g., social security) or unjustified (e.g., psychological entitlement).  A good 
approach to highlighting the distinction between justified entitlement, deservingness, and 
unjustified (psychological) entitlement is asking why.  Why should I expect a raise?  If I 
expect a raise because I have worked extra hard, and have increased sales by 20%, then I 
may truly deserve a raise.  Alternatively, if I expect a raise because I have been with the 
company for two years and such is the company‟s rule (to increase salary after two years 
of employment), then my entitlement may be justified.  However, if I expect a raise 
because I feel that I am inherently worth more than other employees, or because I am 
innately special, then I am likely exhibiting a sense of unjustified or psychological 
entitlement. 
There is a fair amount of research to support the first of the two distinctions—
justified entitlement vs. deservingness.  Feather (2003) proposed that judgments of 
deservingness relate to outcomes that are “earned or achieved as products of a person‟s 
actions”, whereas judgments of entitlement are guided by “agreed-upon body of law, 
social norms, and formal and informal rules”.  Defined this way, Feather‟s 
conceptualization of entitlement aligns with the justified entitlement presented above.  
Following this framework of defining entitlement and deservingness, it appears that the 




outcome, whereas the term “entitlement” (whether justified or not) applies to situations 
that are independent of one‟s actions.  For example, an employee may feel that s/he 
should receive a bonus at the end of the year for two different reasons: a) because s/he 
put forth a great amount of effort to produce high-quality work and demonstrated 
performance on the job beyond expectations, or b) company policy grants every 
employee with an end-of-year bonus calculated as a percentage of an employee‟s wages, 
regardless of work performance.  In the first case, the employee is said to be deserving of 
the bonus because of his or her actions (i.e., producing high-quality work, exceeding 
expectations).  In the second case, the employee is said to be entitled to the bonus 
because the company is supposed to give a bonus to every employee, independent of the 
quantity and quality of work done.  In other words, the entitled employee perceives that 
the positive outcome (i.e., the bonus) is not so much his or her own responsibility, but 
rather an expected outcome based on the company‟s policy (i.e., end-of-year bonus for 
all).   
To test the conceptual distinction between justified entitlement and deservingness 
empirically, Feather (2003) conducted two studies to examine whether participants were 
actually able to distinguish between entitlement and deservingness.  In one of the studies, 
participants were given a scenario of a student running for election in a national student 
organization, where the student exerted high vs. low effort, was eligible or not eligible to 
run for election by virtue of age, and was either elected or not elected (Feather, 2003).  In 
the other study, participants were presented with a scenario, where a person suffering 
from an illness was to decide how to divide his will among his son, nephew, or friend, 




respective scenario were evaluated by asking participants to complete ratings of justified 
entitlement and deservingness.  Results from both studies showed that participants were 
able to distinguish between justified entitlement and deservingness by giving high ratings 
of justified entitlement when the outcome involved an external network of rights, norms, 
and social norms (e.g., age eligibility), and giving high ratings of deservingness when the 
outcome involved personal responsibility (e.g., actions such as effort).   
The distinction between deservingness and unjustified (psychological) entitlement 
is equally important, yet it has not been supported by any research.  What is more, the 
distinction between these two concepts should be even more apparent than the distinction 
between deservingness and justified entitlement that was just presented.  As discussed 
above, deservingness is associated with personal responsibility and merit.  Someone who 
feels deserving of a reward actually did the work to deserve the reward.  By contrast, 
unjustified or psychological entitlement has nothing to do with personal responsibility or 
merit—it is entirely based on one‟s self-concept of being inherently special, precious, and 
exceptional.  For example, a person may feel they should receive an award for two very 
different reasons: 1) because s/he put forth a great amount of effort and contributed to 
many accomplishments in the area; 2) because s/he is inherently a special person who 
should receive awards regardless of accomplishments.  In the first case, the person is said 
to be deserving of the award because of his or her actions (i.e., effort, accomplishments).  
In the second case, the person is said to be feeling unjustified entitlement for the award 
because s/he had no contributions or accomplishments.  In other words, the entitled 
individual expects the positive outcome (i.e., the award) without assuming responsibility 




innately special.  This shift of responsibility has been conceptualized as externalized 
responsibility.  In the context of education, externalized responsibility has been defined 
as the lack of responsibility for one‟s education (Chowning & N. J. Campbell, 2009).  
Not surprisingly, several measures of general (non-context-specific) unjustified 
entitlement correlated positively with externalized responsibility (rs = .29 to .38) 
indicating that unjustified entitlement is related to a lack of a sense of personal 
responsibility (Chowning & N. J. Campbell, 2009).  Because the current research is 
focused on psychological (unjustified) entitlement, understanding the distinction between 
deservingness and unjustified entitlement is important.  As explained below, 
distinguishing between these two constructs when constructing psychological entitlement 
measures is an area that needs further attention. 
It is extremely important to characterize measures of “entitlement” as to what they 
actually represent: deservingness, unjustified (psychological) entitlement, or some 
combination of the two.  A measure of psychological entitlement would have a different 
nomological net than a measure of deservingness.  For example, one would expect people 
scoring high on a measure representing psychological entitlement to score low or 
moderate on a measure of effort, because effort has practically nothing to do with the 
expectation of rewards or resources.  On the contrary, people scoring high on a measure 
representing deservingness should score high on a measure of effort because unlike 
entitlement, deservingness and effort go hand in hand.  When a measure confounds 
deservingness and psychological entitlement, one is unable to hypothesize the 
relationship between scores on the confounded measure and scores on external measures 




accurately establishing or expanding a construct‟s nomological net.  To ensure that this 
does not take place, measures should be carefully examined with respect to construct 
validity before use. 
Measurement of Psychological Entitlement 
With the growing interest in psychological entitlement and its emergence from 
simply a component of narcissism to an important independent construct, researchers 
have created several instruments to measure the construct.  Because the focus of the 
current study is on general, non-context-specific psychological entitlement, only 
measures representing general psychological entitlement are reviewed. 
NPI Entitlement subscale (Raskin & Terry, 1988).  The Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory (NPI) was developed by Raskin and Terry in 1988 as a measure of 
narcissism in non-clinical populations.  The NPI consists of seven factors: entitlement, 
authority, exhibitionism, exploitativeness, self-sufficiency, superiority, and vanity.  The 
Entitlement subscale consists of six forced-choice items (e.g., “I will never be satisfied 
until I get all that I deserve” versus “I will take my satisfactions as they come”; Raskin & 
Terry, 1988).  The authors‟ definition of entitlement was “the expectation of special 
privileges over others and special exemptions from normal social demands.”  
Unfortunately, this definition does not appear to align very well with the content of the 
NPI Entitlement items.  Items such as “If I ruled the world it would be a better place” and 
“I have a strong will to power” indicate seeking of authority, dominance, and power—not 
a sense of entitlement.  Further, the item “I will never be satisfied until I get all that I 
deserve” certainly confounds entitlement and deservingness.  If a respondent is truly 




the respondent‟s sense of deservingness, not his or her expectations of special privileges 
and exemptions (what the authors define as entitlement).  Conceptual confounding of this 
type, in addition to the mismatch between the definition of the construct and the content 
of the items used to measure the construct (lack of face validity), as well as psychometric 
issues associated with the development of the NPI (see W. K. Campbell et al., 2004 for 
review) have resulted in concerns about the quality of the NPI Entitlement subscale as a 
measure of entitlement (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004; Pryor, Miller, & Gaughan, 2008; 
Watson & Biderman, 1993).  Despite the measure‟s flaws, it is important to mention the 
NPI when discussing the measurement of psychological entitlement because before the 
emergence of entitlement as an independent construct, the NPI Entitlement subscale was 
the most popular instrument used to study entitlement, and thus it cannot be ignored.  
Yet, the issues associated with the measure indicate that research on psychological 
entitlement conducted using the NPI may be difficult to interpret.  Thus, a better measure 
of psychological entitlement is needed.   
Psychological Entitlement Scale (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004).  With the 
increasing interest in entitlement as an independent construct and in an attempt to resolve 
some of the issues associated with the NPI Entitlement subscale, W. K. Campbell and 
colleagues (2004) developed a stand-alone measure of entitlement—the Psychological 
Entitlement Scale (PES).  The PES consists of 9 Likert items with responses ranging 
from 1 (“strong disagreement) to 7 (“strong agreement”).  The authors defined 
psychological entitlement as “a stable and pervasive sense that one deserves more and is 
entitled to more than others” (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004).  With respect to the 




entitlement, the PES can be considered a measure of unjustified, non-context-specific 
entitlement, based on the following statement by the authors: “Our concept of 
psychological entitlement is intrapsychically pervasive or global; it does not necessarily 
refer to entitlement that results from a specific situation (e.g., “I am entitled to social 
security because I paid into the system,” or “I deserve an „A‟ because I performed well in 
class”)” (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004, p. 31).   
With respect to the distinction between entitlement and deservingness, the authors 
state: “our concept of psychological entitlement includes both the experience of being 
deserving and entitled.”  Although they acknowledge the difference between the two 
terms (“deservingness typically reflects the expectation of a reward in exchange of one‟s 
own efforts or character, whereas entitlement typically reflects the expectation of a 
reward as a result of a social contract”, W. K. Campbell et al., 2004), the authors of the 
PES used the terms interchangeably in the 9 PES items (e.g., “I honestly feel I‟m just 
more deserving than others”, “I feel entitled to more of everything”).  Recall that to 
evaluate whether one is deserving vs. psychologically entitled to an outcome I asked the 
question why.  A quick glance through the PES items (see Appendix) highlights that one 
is unable to answer this question, and therefore cannot determine whether the items are 
measuring entitlement or deservingness.  For example, why am I more deserving than 
others?  Am I more “deserving” because I actually put forth more effort than others, or 
simply because I am special?  Different answers to the question “why” will result in a 
different interpretation of a strong endorsement of this item.  That is, if a respondent 
believes that s/he is more deserving than others because s/he put forth more effort than 




deservingness.  Alternatively, if one endorses the item due to a feeling of being special, 
then the strong endorsement would be interpreted as a high level of psychological 
entitlement.  Despite the likely confound of psychological entitlement and deservingness 
inherent in the measure, the PES remains the best available stand-alone measure of 
general psychological entitlement.  Since its publication in 2004, the PES has been used 
in over 20 published studies. 
Although much research has been conducted on psychological entitlement in the 
past few years and a good deal of this work employed the PES, there remains a question 
regarding the stability of the construct over time.  Research efforts in the domain of 
psychological entitlement have largely focused on expanding entitlement‟s nomological 
net (i.e., investigating how entitlement relates to other constructs).  Although such 
research is of great importance, it would also be useful to know if psychological 
entitlement increases, decreases, or remains approximately the same over time.  Authors 
of the PES claim psychological entitlement is stable: “we consider psychological 
entitlement to reflect a chronic or stable disposition rather than a response to a specific 
social situation” (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004, p. 35).  It appears from this description 
that psychological entitlement could be considered a rather steady personality 
characteristic (trait).  In order to assess this argument, next I discuss the distinction 
between trait and state-line personality attributes.    
Trait vs. State  
When studying a construct, it is important that one understands how likely it is for 
the construct to change over a long time period.  With respect to changeability, constructs 




are relatively stable across occasions (Hertzog & Nesselroade, 1987).  Spielberger (1972, 
1975, 1983) described personality traits as enduring individual differences in people or 
tendencies to perceive the world in a certain way and dispositions to react or behave in a 
particular fashion with predictable regularity.  Trait anxiety, for example, falls in the 
category of traits, because it is characterized by constant worry and uneasiness.  
States comprise attributes in individuals that are relatively changeable over time 
or occasions (Hertzog & Nesselroade, 1987).  Spielberger (1972, 1975, 1983) defined 
personality states as transitory conditions that exist at a given moment at a certain 
intensity level.  As such, states are often thought to be situation-specific.  State anxiety, 
for example, only occurs in certain conditions (e.g., test anxiety occurs in the context of 
completing a test).  
Given that traits and states are very different in nature (i.e., traits are stable, 
whereas states are transitory, changeable attributes), examining longitudinal stability can 
provide some insight into whether a construct is a trait or a state (Conley, 1984; Meyer & 
Shack, 1989; Nesselroade, 1986).  Given that traits are stable, enduring attributes, a trait 
construct is expected to demonstrate high rank-order consistency and little mean-change 
over time (except when traits are measured during a developmental stage; Ozar & Gjerde, 
1989).  On the other hand, given that states are attributes transitory in nature, such 
constructs are expected to demonstrate less stability when measured at different times or 
occasions (Usala & Hertzog, 1991).   
The importance of studying the temporal stability of constructs has been shown 
by many researchers.  Veenhoven (1994), for example, investigated whether happiness 




was stable, but over longer periods of time it was not.  This finding is important because 
it demonstrates that constructs are not always easy to categorize as either trait or state, 
and often empirical evidence from longitudinal studies determines how the construct is 
conceptualized over the course of human development.  
Existing Claims and Evidence Regarding the Stability of Psychological Entitlement 
Although psychological entitlement has been the subject of much study, little 
research has been devoted to assessing the temporal stability of the construct.  For this 
reason, all available research on entitlement‟s stability over time will be reviewed.  
Moreover, stability research on the construct that is next of kin to entitlement—
narcissism—will also be reviewed.  That is, because entitlement was first defined as a 
component of narcissism and later studied in the context of narcissism, examining the 
stability of narcissism should provide additional insight into the stability of entitlement 
across time. 
Research on the stability of entitlement across time.  The study of entitlement 
as an independent construct was largely influenced by the development of the 
Psychological Entitlement Scale (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004).  Recall that the authors 
defined psychological entitlement as “a stable and pervasive sense that one deserves more 
and is entitled to more than others” (p. 35).  The researchers further state: “we consider 
psychological entitlement to reflect a chronic or stable disposition rather than a response 
to a specific social situation” (p.35).  It appears that the authors conceptualize entitlement 
as a personality trait; however, no theoretical explanation is provided as to why 
entitlement should be considered a stable trait.  Empirically, there was some evidence of 




administered the PES at two time points, 1 month apart for one sample, and 2 months 
apart for the other sample.  The results yielded rank-order consistency coefficients of .72 
and .70, respectively, leading the authors to the conclusion that “the PES is stable over 
time” (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004).  With respect to mean-level change in entitlement 
across time, PES scores at baseline were 28.8 and 27.7 and increased to 30.3 (1 month 
later) and 30.6 (2 months later) upon subsequent testing (scale ranges from 7 to 63).  No 
interpretations of these mean-level changes were provided by the researchers. 
Zitek and colleagues (2010) proposed that psychological entitlement is not just a 
chronic disposition, but can also be a dynamic mindset.  They suggested that “an 
individual can also vary in the extent to which s/he feels entitled in the course of any 
given day, depending on what past experiences are salient in the individual‟s mind when 
the opportunity for selfish behavior presents itself” (Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 
2010, p. 246).  The authors supported this view of psychological entitlement through a 
series of experiments in a repeated measures design, where participants expressed higher 
levels of psychological entitlement (represented by several adapted PES items) when they 
were wronged, or even reminded of a time when they were wronged.  Thus, these studies 
provide some evidence that psychological entitlement may not be as “pervasive and 
stable” as defined by W. K. Campbell and colleagues (2004) but rather may be situation-
specific, or state-like.   
Research on the stability of narcissism across time.  Given the limited 
empirical evidence regarding the stability of psychological entitlement, the stability of 
narcissism is reviewed next as a source of evidence for the temporal stability of a 




in the DSM-III-R and DSM-IV-TR as a personality disorder, and all personality disorders 
stem from maladaptive personality traits (DSM-III-R, 1980), one would expect 
narcissism to be relatively stable over time.  Consistent with the initial interest in 
narcissism in clinical populations, the first instance of studying narcissism over time was 
with patients diagnosed with clinical narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).  
Ronningstam, Gunderson, and Lyons (1995) studied 20 NPD patients over the course of 
3 years, and found that for 12 of the patients, levels of pathological narcissism as 
measured by the NPD criteria in the DSM-III-R and DSM-IV decreased by over 50%, 
and remained unchanged for the other 8 patients.  Moreover, the qualitative research 
accompanying the study revealed that corrective achievements (e.g., graduations, 
promotions, recognitions, acceptance to sought-after schools, programs, or positions, etc.) 
were the most common type of event that contributed to the decrease in pathological 
entitlement (Ronningstam et al., 1995).  
Another stability study of narcissism was conducted a decade later using the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988).  Del Rosario and White 
(2005) administered the NPI to a college population at baseline, and again 13 weeks later.  
The authors reported rank-order consistency coefficients for the full 40-item NPI scale, as 
well as for each of the seven subscales.  The entire NPI scale demonstrated high test-
retest stability (r = .81), and test-retest stability coefficients for most of the subscales 
ranged from high moderate (r = .70-.80) to low moderate (r = .60-.70), with entitlement 
being the component of narcissism with lowest stability (r = .57).  The researchers 
concluded that the NPI scale and its subscales demonstrated satisfactory stability, 




expected (del Rosario & White, 2005).  It should be noted, however, that one could 
question the utility and interpretability of an overall NPI stability coefficient, considering 
the wide range of test-retest stability coefficients among the subscales.  
In a study examining the psychometric properties of the Italian version of the NPI, 
Fossati, Borroni, and Maffei (2008) reported test-retest stability for the full NPI scale for 
a clinical and a non-clinical population over the course of three months:  the stability 
coefficient for the non-clinical sample was higher (r = .87) than it was in the clinical 
sample (r = .72).  Nonetheless, this study lends further support that narcissism, as 
measured by the NPI, may be relatively stable over time.  However, as mentioned above, 
it seems it would be more meaningful to present and interpret stability coefficients for the 
NPI subscales individually. 
In sum, there are few studies assessing the stability of entitlement and narcissism 
over time.  Moreover, the few empirical findings do not appear to align with the 
commonly accepted theoretical conceptualization of psychological entitlement.  
Specifically, W. K. Campbell and colleagues (2004) defined entitlement as “stable” but 
provided no theoretical justification for this classification.  Furthermore, the empirical 
evidence they presented is insufficient to support their claim for several reasons.  First, 
they did not assess measurement invariance across time.  Thus, any rank-order 
consistency coefficients or mean-level change estimates may be uninterpretable.  Second, 
the authors deemed test-retest consistency coefficients to be sufficient evidence that the 
construct is stable, without interpreting the mean-level change in entitlement from 




Similar limitations are associated with the stability studies using the NPI (del 
Rosario & White, 2005; Fossati et al., 2008).  First, there have been no studies of 
longitudinal measurement invariance of the NPI.  Second, del Rosario and White (2005) 
reported high moderate (r = .70 - .80) to low moderate (r = .60 - .70) test-retest 
consistency coefficients for six of the subscales, and the lowest coefficient (r = .57) for 
the entitlement subscale.  Because of the discrepancies of the coefficient values across 
subscales, the high overall stability coefficient for the full scale is difficult to interpret.  
Moreover, del Rosario and White did not interpret mean-level change.  Such isolated 
results make it difficult to determine whether the entitlement construct is stable or not. 
Clearly, further study is needed to address these issues and provide more empirical 
evidence.  
Is psychological entitlement stable over long periods of time?  Both empirical 
findings and theory suggest that some individual differences may be highly stable over 
short periods of time but less stable as the time interval between testing occasions 
increases (Fraley & Roberts, 2005; Veenhoven, 1994).  Recall that when studied over 1 
or 2 month periods, entitlement‟s test-retest consistency was .72 and .70, respectively.  In 
addition, when studied as a component of narcissism and assessed over a 13-week time 
period, entitlement was associated with the lowest stability coefficient (r =. 57).  These 
results may suggest that over short periods of time, entitlement may be indeed stable; 
however, over long periods of time (>1 year), entitlement may not be as stable.  Given 
the limited empirical evidence and theoretical background on psychological entitlement, I 






Data Collection Procedure 
Responses to the PES were collected from college students at a mid-sized 
southeastern university as part of a large-scale testing session for institutional 
accountability purposes (U.S. Department of Education, 2006).  Specifically, in order to 
examine the “value-added” due to attending the university, a sample of students was 
assessed on a battery of both knowledge (e.g., quantitative reasoning) and attitudinal 
measures (e.g., PES) twice during their college career: once as incoming freshmen (Time 
1), and again in the spring semester of their sophomore year (1.5 years after they started 
college) if they had completed between 45 and 70 credit hours (Time 2).  Most incoming 
freshmen were assessed at Time 1.  However, it is important to note that not all students 
who were administered the PES at Time 1 also completed the measure at Time 2.  Some 
students, who completed the PES at Time 1, earned more than 70 credits by the end of 
their third semester, and therefore were not required to complete the assessments at Time 
2.  Likewise, not all students who were administered the PES at Time 2 completed the 
measure at Time 1.  For example, students who transferred to the university and had 
earned enough credit hours to complete the assessments at Time 2 would not have PES 
scores at Time 1.  The group of participants that is of interest for the current study is 
comprised of students who completed the PES both at Time 1 and Time 2. 
It is important to note that although these assessments are mandatory and high-
stakes to the university, they are of low-stakes to the students.  That is, although the 




results bare no serious personal consequences.  Therefore, some participants may not 
have been very motivated to put forth their best effort while completing the assessments, 
which in turn may affect the reliability of scores, as well as the validity of inferences 
made based on scores.  Fortunately, the PES is a short measure, thus participants are not 
likely to get fatigued.  Moreover, as described below, extensive data screening was 
conducted to identify and remove any participants who were likely not providing valid 
responses to the PES. 
Measure 
The Psychological Entitlement Scale (PES; W. K. Campbell et al., 2004) was 
used to measure participants‟ levels of psychological entitlement at Time 1 and Time 2 
(see Appendix for PES items).  The PES consists of 9 Likert items with response options 
ranging from 1 (“strong disagreement”) to 7 (”strong agreement”).  Item 5 (“I do not 
necessarily deserve special treatment”) is negatively-phrased, and thus Item 5 was 
reverse-scored prior to data analysis.  Higher PES scores indicate a greater level of 
psychological entitlement.  Importantly, the reverse-scored Item 5 was used to identify 
respondents who provided invalid scores (i.e., engaged in a response set), as is discussed 
below.   
Participants 
Data from Time 1: Incoming college freshmen.  At Time 1, responses were 
gathered from 3749 incoming college freshmen.  Only 35 participants (0.9%) had missing 
data on one or more of the PES items.  These 35 students were excluded from the sample, 
resulting in 3714 freshmen with complete data from the first testing occasion.  Further, 




participants were deemed multivariate outliers due to their nonsensical response patterns 
(e.g., 1, 7, 1, 7,…).  Moreover, 29 participants provided what appeared to be response 
sets (e.g., 7, 7, 7, 7, 1, 7, 7, 7, 7).  Recall Item 5 is negatively-phrased and was reverse-
scored; thus, these 29 participants appear to not have attended to the content of the items 
and simply recorded the same response (e.g., “7”) for every item.  Thus, an additional 35 
participants were removed, leaving a sample of 3679 at Time 1.   
Data from Time 2: Second-semester sophomores.  At Time 2, responses to the 
PES were gathered from 3346 participants.  It is important to note that this sample of 
3346 participants consisted only of students with 45-70 credits.  Thus, not all students 
who were tested at Time 1 were tested at Time 2; some students tested at Time 1 had less 
than 45 credits or more than 70 credits and were not eligible to be tested at Time 2.  In 
addition, this Time 2 sample contains participants who were not tested at Time 1 (transfer 
students).   
Only 33 participants had missing data on some PES items (1.0%), and thus were 
excluded from the sample, resulting in 3313 participants with complete data from the 
second testing occasion.  Further, Mahalanobis distance values were examined, and six 
participants were identified as multivariate outliers with nonsensical response patterns 
(e.g., 2, 7, 1, 7,…).  Moreover, 31 participants were identified as providing a response set 
(e.g., 2, 2, 2, 2, 6, 2, 2, 2, 2), thus resulting in a sample of 3276 at Time 2.   
Matched data (Time 1 and Time 2).  For the purposes of the analyses in the 
current study, datasets from Time 1 and Time 2 were matched by participant ID, resulting 
in a sample of 2195 participants with complete data from both Time 1 (incoming 




across testing occasions before the removal of outliers and response sets is presented in 
Table 1.  The noticeable decrease in the number of participants in the matched sample 
compared to the individual samples at Time 1 (N = 3679) and Time 2 (N = 3276) is due 
to the fact that some participants were not tested at either occasion for one of two 
reasons.  As mentioned above, some students who were tested at Time 1 were not tested 
at Time 2 because they were not eligible to be tested; in fact only 65% of those tested at 
Time 1 (or 2442 of the 3749 students tested at Time 1) were within the required range of 
45-70 credit hours in order to be tested at Time 2.  In addition, 12% of the students who 
were tested at Time 2 (or 402 of the 3346 students tested at Time 2) had no data from 
Time 1 because they were transfer students.  Thus, these two groups of students explain 
the decreased sample size of the matched sample compared to the full sample at Time 1 
or Time 2 (see Table 1). 
The matched sample consisted of 83.1% Caucasian students, 5.2% Asian students, 
2.7% Hispanic students, 2.1% Black students, 0.6% Pacific Islander students, 0.2% 
American Indian students, and 6.1% students who did not specify their ethnic 
background.  The sample consisted of 66.7% female students.  At Time 1, the participants 
had an average age of 18.43 years (SD = 0.39). 
Data Analysis and Model Evaluation 
The PES data from Time 1 and Time 2 were analyzed in three stages.  First, an 
examination and interpretation of descriptive statistics was conducted.  Next, 
measurement invariance was tested.  Finally, given (at least partial) measurement 




When testing measurement invariance, model fit was assessed via a chi-square 
(χ
2
) significance test of global fit, several indices of approximate fit, and residuals.  The 
χ
2 
significance test is an exact test of the model-data fit.  That is, a significant χ
2 
would 
indicate that elements of the reproduced covariance matrix are significantly different 
from elements of the original covariance matrix.  Researchers have noted that the χ
2 
test 
is very sensitive to sample size, such that when sample size increases, so does the 
likelihood of obtaining a significant χ
2
 (Hu & Bentler, 1998).  Because of this, and more 
importantly, because researchers are typically interested in measures of approximate fit 
rather than measures of exact fit, the χ
2
 was supplemented by two types of approximate 
fit indices: absolute and incremental. 
The standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) is an absolute fit index, 
which indicates the degree of global misfit between the observed and model-implied 
relationships among the modeled variables.  The SRMR is especially sensitive to 
misspecified factor correlations. SRMR values range from 0 to 1, and smaller values are 
indicative of better fit.  Specifically, researchers have recommended a cutoff value of ≤ 
.08 as an indicator of adequate global model-data fit (Hu & Bentler, 1998; 1999). 
The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is another absolute fit 
index indicative of global model-data fit.  The RMSEA is sensitive to misspecified factor 
pattern coefficients (i.e., the relationships between the factor and the items).  Values for 
the RMSEA range from 0 to 1, and smaller values are indicative of better fit.  
Specifically, values ≤ .06 have been recommended as indicators of good global model-




The comparative fit index (CFI) is an incremental fit index, which compares the 
fit of the hypothesized model to a null model, where the relationships among all observed 
variables (items in the current study) are set to equal zero.  That is, the CFI indicates the 
degree of model-data fit improvement of the current model from a null model.  Similar to 
the RMSEA, the CFI is very sensitive to misspecified factor pattern coefficients (Hu & 
Bentler, 1998).  CFI values range from 0 to 1, with larger values indicative of better fit.  
Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend using a cutoff of ≥ .95 as a criterion for good global 
fit.   
It is important to note that some researchers have challenged the appropriateness 
of the aforementioned fit index cutoff values and have recommended using them as 
guidelines rather than exact rules (Fan & Sivo, 2007; Marsh, Hau, & Grayson, 2005; 
Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004; Sharma, Mukherjee, Kumar, & Dillon, 2005).  In fact, Hu and 
Bentler (1998) themselves advise that unlike the strict χ
2
 statistic, which offers a 
dichotomous decision based on a significance test, fit indices can be used to “quantify the 
degree of fit along a continuum” (p. 426).  Moreover, Vandenberg and Lance (2000) 
suggest using a range of cutoffs instead of strict cutoffs.  
In addition to assessing global fit with the χ
2
 test and approximate fit indices, 
local model-data fit was assessed by examining each correlation and mean residual.  
Correlation residuals are simply the difference values between elements of the observed 
correlation matrix and corresponding elements of the reproduced correlation matrix.  
Correlation residuals greater than |.10| are indicative of specific item-pair relationships 
not reproduced well by the model (Kline, 2011).  Mean residuals, which are pertinent 




means and the reproduced item means for each item at a given time point.  Unlike the 
correlation residuals, there is no specific cutoff value that could serve as a guideline in 
establishing scalar measurement invariance.  Rather, the mean residuals should be 
interpreted in the context of the scale being used (e.g., residuals of |.50| on a 4-point scale 






Descriptive statistics for the 9 PES items are summarized in Table 2.  The item 
means and standard deviations were examined to determine how respondents scored on 
average and the variability in scores around these means.  Item means varied between 2.4 
and 3.7 at Time 1, and between 2.5 and 3.6 at Time 2, indicating respondents tended to 
slightly or moderately disagree with the entitlement statements.  All standard deviations 
were greater than 1.0, indicating there was sufficient variability associated with each item 
(i.e., no floor or ceiling effects).  In addition, frequency distributions indicated all 
response options (i.e., 1 through 7) were utilized by respondents at both time points.   
Univariate normality was assessed via comparison of skewness and kurtosis 
values for the 9 PES items against suggested cutoffs of |2| and |7|, respectively (West, 
Finch, & Curran, 1995).  All 9 items displayed univariate normal distributions; univariate 
skewness and kurtosis values at both time points were less than |1.0|.  Multivariate 
normality was assessed via Mardia‟s normalized multivariate kurtosis statistic.  Although 
there is no agreed-upon cutoff value, the Mardia‟s value is typically reported in 
covariance structures analysis.  Mardia‟s normalized multivariate kurtosis for the sample 
at Time 1 was 35.55, and 43.30 at Time 2, suggesting multivariate non-normality (Finney 
& DiStefano, 2006).  Because of the possible effects of multivariate non-normality, the 
Satorra-Bentler (S-B) scaling method (Satorra & Bentler, 1994) was employed in 
conjunction with maximum likelihood (ML) estimation.  The S-B scaling adjusts the ML 
χ
2




biased estimates of model fit and standard errors of the estimated parameters (Finney & 
DiStefano, 2006).  Given the univariate normality of the data, CFAs were also conducted 
using the ML estimator without the S-B adjustment, in order to determine whether the 
use of the S-B scaling method would produce substantively different results.  Previous 
studies have reported that when the data are fairly normally distributed univariately and 
have at least five response options, bias due to multivariate non-normality is negligible 
(Finney & DiStefano, 2006; West, Finch, & Curran, 1995).  Indeed, the χ
2
 statistic, 
standard errors, and fit indices did not differ substantially when the unadjusted ML 
estimator and the S-B scaling method were employed.  Therefore, only the (unadjusted) 
ML estimation results are presented here. 
Multicollinearity was assessed within time points by examining the correlation 
matrix for highly related items (r > .80).  Within each time point, the PES items were 
moderately correlated at both time points, with the largest correlations being .59 at Time 
1 and .61 at Time 2, indicating no extreme multicollinearity.   
Recall that Item 5 is negatively-phrased, and as such it correlated less strongly 
with the other items.  Ignoring Item 5, the inter-item correlations were of approximately 
the same magnitude (ranging from .36 to .59 for Time 1 and from .36 to .61 for Time 2), 
suggesting that a unidimensional model might represent the data well, with a weak 
relationship between Item 5 and the factor at both time points.  This hypothesized model 
was formally assessed when testing configural invariance.  
Measurement Invariance 
LMACS analysis was used to test configural, metric, and scalar invariance. 




evaluated, configural, metric, and scalar invariance need to be established (Bontempo & 
Hofer, 2006; Sass, 2011; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998; Thompson & Green, 2006, 
Vandenberg & Lance, 2000; Widaman, Ferrer, & Conger, 2010).  Several additional tests 
of invariance can be performed (e.g., test of equivalent error variances, test of equal 
factor variances); however, these tests are not necessary when the researcher‟s purpose is 
to compare latent means (Byrne & Stewart, 2006; Schmitt & Kuljanin, 2008; Widaman 
& Reise, 1997). 
Indices used to assess measurement invariance.  Testing for measurement 
invariance involved a multi-step approach, with less constrained models being supported 
before more constrained models were tested.  Moreover, because the more constrained 
models are nested within the less constrained models, differences in model fit could be 
evaluated.  Specifically, if the fit of a more constrained model was not statistically or 
practically worse than the fit of a less constrained model, invariance at the level of the 
more constrained model was established (Dimitrov, 2006; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 
1998).  Both a non-significant chi-square difference (Δχ
2
) test and CFI difference ≤ .01 
were used as criteria in evaluating measurement invariance models.  Specifically, some 
researchers contend that similar to the χ
2
 statistic, the Δχ
2
 is also an exact test of fit, and 
therefore it should be supplemented with change in the values of approximate fit indices, 
such as the CFI (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998).  Cheung and Rensvold (2002) have 
suggested that the CFI is especially effective when examining the difference in fit across 
nested models, and have recommended change in CFI (ΔCFI) ≤ .01 as an indicator of 
invariance.  Other researchers, however, have challenged this approach, noting that the 
CFI lacks power and may not signal non-invariance when the Δχ
2






 test should be used (French & Finch, 2006).  Still other researchers have 
argued that a relative fit (e.g., CFI) approach is more appropriate for the measurement 
part, whereas an exact fit (Δχ
2
) approach is more appropriate for the structural part (e.g., 
when estimating the latent mean difference) of invariance testing (Little, Card, Slegers, & 
Ledford, 2007).  Given that the Δχ
2
 test and the ΔCFI often provide conflicting results, 
these two indices were supplemented by the correlation and mean residuals in order to 
determine whether invariance had been established. 
Scaling the factor.  There are several methods of setting the metric of the 
factor(s) being modeled and each method has different advantages.
1
  For a single group 
CFA model, it is common practice to scale the factor by setting its variance to a value of 
one.  In this case, the researcher is not interested in estimating or interpreting the factor 
variance, but rather the factor pattern coefficients.  In testing measurement invariance 
over time, however, this method may not be appropriate for several reasons.  First, fixing 
the factor variance to one at each time point assumes that factor variances are equal 
across time, which is overly restrictive (Marsh, 1994).  Related to this point, when testing 
for metric invariance, one would be testing the invariance of factor variances in addition 
to the invariance of factor pattern coefficients (just the latter would be sufficient to 
establish metric invariance), thus making the model too restrictive.  Second, it may of 
interest to the researcher to estimate the factor variances and interpret them in order to 
gauge the variability of latent scores across time.   
Given these considerations, the factors in each model were scaled by fixing the 
factor pattern coefficient between the factor and Item 9 to a value of one (i.e., Item 9 




freely estimated or constrained to a value appropriate for the level of invariance being 
tested.  This constraint on Item 9 to set the metric of the factor assumes that Item 9 is 
invariant across time. To test the invariance of Item 9, each of the models were re-
estimated using Item 1 as the referent indicator (see Rensvold & Cheung, 2001).  Given 
that all of these re-estimated models resulted in the same fit as their counterparts when 
Item 9 was used as the referent item, the invariance of Item 9 was established.   
Configural invariance.  Configural invariance was tested in two steps.  First, the 
covariance matrices from each time point were analyzed separately to test if the one-
factor model fit the data at Time 1 and Time 2 independently.  CFAs were conducted 
using LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006).   
The one-factor model fit the data well globally at both time points: 
2 
(27, N = 
2195) = 434.45, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .04 at Time 1; 
2 
(27, N = 2195) = 
541.19, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .04 at Time 2.  Moreover, there were no 
localized areas of misfit at either time point; all correlation residuals were less than |.10|, 
with the largest being .08 at both time points, and 72% of the correlation residuals falling 
at or below |.05| at Time 1 and 67% at Time 2.  Given adequate model-data fit, factor 
pattern coefficients could be interpreted. 
Large standardized pattern coefficients suggest that items adequately represented 
the construct (Thompson, 1997).  At both Time 1 and Time 2, all 9 PES items were 
associated with standardized pattern coefficients at or above .65 and .67, respectively, 
indicating that the factor explained at least 42% (Time 1) and 45% (Time 2) of each 
item‟s variance, except for Item 5 (8% and 14%, respectively; see Table 3).  The weak 




correlations between Item 5 and the remaining items on the PES.  Importantly, four of the 
PES items at Time 1 and six at Time 2 had standardized pattern coefficients at or above 
.7 (i.e., the factor explained at least 50% of its items‟ variance).  Except for Item 5, the 
items appeared to represent the factor well.  Moreover, internal consistency, calculated 
using the CFA‟s unstandardized parameters (McDonald, 1999; Reuterberg & Gustafsson, 
1992), was adequate (ω = .88 at Time 1 and .89 at Time 2). 
The second step of testing for configural invariance involved fitting a 
unidimensional factor structure to the data from Time 1 and Time 2 simultaneously by 
analyzing the large covariance matrix that represents both time points (i.e., analyze the 
relationships represented in Table 2).  This model, pictured in Figure 2, includes error 
covariances between corresponding items from Time 1 and Time 2 (autocorrelations) to 
account for the systematic error variance shared by corresponding pairs of items across 
testing occasions.  As expected, given the well-fitting independent CFA models, this 
combined model fit the data from Time 1 and Time 2 well globally (see Table 4), with no 
localized areas of misfit (all correlation residuals were < |.10|, with 85% of the residuals 
being < |.05|).  Both the unstandardized and standardized pattern coefficients remained 
essentially the same as those presented in Table 3.  Given these results, configural 
invariance was established, and this model was used as the baseline model for testing 
metric invariance. 
Metric invariance.  In the metric invariance model, corresponding 
unstandardized factor pattern coefficients at Time 1 and Time 2 were constrained to be 
equal, whereas the remaining parameters were freely estimated.  The metric invariance 




baseline (configural invariance) model (see Table 4).  Moreover, all correlation residuals 
were < |.10| (83% were < |.05|), indicating no localized areas of misfit.  With respect to 
the PES, establishing metric invariance indicated that each of the nine items were equally 
salient to the factor across time.  That is, the construct was equally well represented by 
the PES items at Time 1 and Time 2.  Given metric invariance was established, this 
model served as the baseline model for testing scalar invariance. 
Scalar invariance.  Several scalar invariance models were tested (see Table 4).  
In each model, the intercept for Item 9 was fixed to zero at Time 1 and Time 2, in order 
to estimate the factor means.  In the first (fully constrained) scalar invariance model, the 
intercepts of all corresponding items were constrained to be equal across time.  This 
scalar model fit the data well globally; however, the Δχ
2
 test comparing the fit of this 
model to the fit of the metric invariance model was significant, signaling partial scalar 
non-invariance.   
Examination of the residuals for the means indicated somewhat large residuals for 
the means of Items 4, 2, and 3: |.11|, |.10|, and |.05|, respectively, on a 7-point scale.  It is 
important to note that due to the equality constraints placed on the item intercepts, when 
an item mean is not fully driven by the latent mean across time, there will be a positive 
residual associated with that item mean at one point, and a negative residual for the item 
mean at the other time point.  For example, the value of -.11 indicated that the mean for 
Item 4 was overestimated by the model by about a tenth of a point at Time 1 and 
accordingly underestimated by the same amount at Time 2 (i.e., a positive residual of 
.11).  That is, the model implied means for Item 4 reflect solely the latent mean 




indicates the estimated latent mean difference underestimated the observed mean 
difference across time for Item 4.  Interestingly, the opposite was true for Item 2 (i.e., the 
item mean was underestimated by the model at Time 1 and overestimated at Time 2, 
respectively), indicating that the means for Items 2 and 4 were “biased” in opposite 
directions from Time 1 to Time 2.  Again, these mean residuals reflect the restrictive 
equality constraints that were imposed on the item intercepts.  That is, when specifying 
both metric and scalar invariance, the model-implied item means at Time 1 and Time 2 
can only reflect the latent means at Time 1 and Time 2.  In other words, something other 
than the factor is influencing the responses to those three items, leading to systematic 
over- (Item 4) and underestimation (Items 2 and 3) of the item means at Time 1.   
The mean residuals associated with these three items were not large given the 7-
point scale.  In order to assess the potential effect of scalar non-invariance (or uniform 
differential item functioning, DIF) for Items 2, 3, and 4, three additional scalar invariance 
models were estimated, the fit of which was compared back to the baseline (metric 
invariance) model.  These results are presented in Table 4.  The equal-intercept constraint 
for the three potentially non-invariant items was released in each model one at a time 
(i.e., first for Item 4, then for Item 2, and finally for Item 3).  The tests were conducted in 
this particular order based on the absolute size of the residuals associated with these items 
(largest to smallest). The Δχ
2
 tests between the baseline (metric invariance) model and 
the first two models were significant, indicating that even when the intercepts associated 
with Items 4 and 2 were freely estimated across time, these two models still fit 
significantly worse than the baseline metric invariance model.  That is, some additional 




each of these two models had one mean residual greater than |.05| indicating the intercept 
for that item should not be constrained to be equal across time, in order to obtain accurate 
mean estimates.  For the last scalar invariance model (freely estimated intercepts for 
Items 4, 2, and 3) however, the Δχ
2
 test was not significant, indicating this partial scalar 
invariance model fit the data no worse than the baseline metric invariance model.  
Moreover, no mean residual was greater than |.03| (a trivial difference, given the 7-point 
scale), indicating this partial scalar invariance model reproduced the means most 
accurately compared to the other scalar invariance models that were tested.  Given these 
results, this third partial scalar invariance model was deemed to best represent the data 
from Time 1 and Time 2, with Items 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 demonstrating full measurement 
invariance, and Items 2, 3, and 4 having configural and metric, but no scalar invariance.  
However, this conclusion may be conservative, as the mean residuals were not overly 
large for any item.  Thus, to more fully evaluate the impact of the scalar non-invariant 
items and assess its practical significance, latent mean difference tests were computed 
with and without placing equality constraints on the intercepts associated with Items 2, 3, 
and 4. 
Latent Variable Stability 
Given partial scalar invariance, a test of the latent mean difference was conducted 
both with and without placing equality constraints on the scalar non-invariant items (see 
Table 5).  It is important to note that when the intercepts for some items are freely 
estimated across time, those items do not contribute to the latent mean at either time 
point.  Regardless of whether the intercepts for the non-invariant items were constrained 




and the effect size was small (.012 and .041, respectively).  The high similarity in latent 
mean difference results based on all PES items (i.e., the intercepts for all corresponding 
items were constrained to be equal across time) vs. only scalar invariant items (i.e., the 
intercepts of scalar non-invariant items were freely estimated across time) was most 
likely due to items having opposite patterns of uniform DIF.  That is, the mean for Item 4 
was overestimated at Time 1, whereas the means for Items 2 and 3 were underestimated 
at Time 1.  The opposite pattern occurred for Time 2.  Thus, the latent mean difference 
was not affected by the presence of this DIF in the fully scalar invariant model.  
Practically the same results were obtained by computing a mean difference at the 
observed level. The similarity of results at the latent and the observed level was due to 
the high internal consistency of the observed PES scores at Time 1 and Time 2 (ω = .88 
at Time 1 and .89 at Time 2).   
Given the equivalence of factor structures and unstandardized pattern coefficients 
(i.e., full configural and metric invariance), latent rank-order consistency across time 
could be interpreted.  The correlation coefficient between the psychological entitlement 
factors at Time 1 and Time 2 was .61, p < .05 (factor variances at Time 1 and Time 2 
were 1.16 and 1.32, respectively), indicating that the rank-order of respondents did 
change to some degree.  Although attenuated due to measurement error, the correlation of 
observed scores at Time 1 and Time 2 was practically of the same value (r = .58, p < .05).  
Again, the highly similar latent and observed score correlations are due to the high 
internal consistency of the PES scores at both time points.   
Given that rank-order consistency was only moderate, it appears that some 




minimal, practically insignificant mean-level change over 1.5 years.  Moreover, this 
differential change was demonstrated by plotting the change trajectories of a random 
sample of 5% of the participants (see Figure 4).  The graph clearly shows that some 
participants increased on entitlement from Time 1 to Time 2, others decreased across 





The purpose of the current study was two-fold.  First, a review and comparison of 
commonly used methods of assessing construct stability over two time points and a 
modern latent variable approach (LMACS analysis) was provided.  Second, the 
application of LMACS analysis to assess stability claims about psychological entitlement 
was demonstrated.  Below is an in-depth discussion of the importance of assessing 
longitudinal measurement invariance and the effects of partial non-invariance (i.e., items 
displaying DIF), followed by the implications of the current study for the psychological 
entitlement domain, and ending with some highlights of the advantages of using a unified 
LMACS analysis approach to assessing invariance and construct stability over two time 
points. 
Establishing Measurement Invariance for the PES and Assessing the Effects of 
Partial Non-Invariance 
The current study demonstrated how to empirically test the assumption of 
measurement invariance in longitudinal research.  In order to do so, several models with 
various levels of equality constraints were specified and fit to the PES data at Time 1 and 
Time 2.  First, a hypothesized one-factor model was fit to the data at each time point 
independently and then with the data combined (configural invariance) to establish a 
comparable factor structure across time.  Both the independent one-factor models and the 
combined data (correlated single-factor) model fit the PES data well, meaning that 
participants defined the construct represented by the PES items similarly across time.  If 




tests, would have been meaningful because one would be comparing scores representing 
conceptually different things.  Fortunately, the PES demonstrated stable factor structure 
across time; thus, the stability of measurement parameters could be assessed. 
Subsequent invariance testing involved constraining the magnitude of factor 
pattern coefficients (metric invariance) and intercepts (scalar invariance) of 
corresponding items to be equal across time.  The model with constrained factor pattern 
coefficients resulted in adequate fit, indicating that corresponding PES items were 
equally representative of the factor across time.  That is, each item was as salient to the 
factor at Time 1 as it was at Time 2.  However, if this metric model did not fit the data 
well, one would be observing non-uniform DIF (revealed by large correlation residuals 
for metric non-invariant items across time).  In a longitudinal design, non-uniform DIF 
occurs when an item‟s observed score differs from one testing occasion to the next, 
whereas the latent score remains the same across time.  That is, the item could be highly 
related to the factor at Time 1, but the relationship with the factor becomes weaker at 
Time 2, or vice versa; thus biasing the total score at either time point.  When non-uniform 
DIF is present, one should no longer interpret the total scores from Time 1 and Time 2 
because they are no longer comparable and could lead the researcher to erroneous 
conclusions.  Fortunately, the model with equality constraints on the factor pattern 
coefficients of corresponding PES items fit the data just as well as the unconstrained 
configural invariance model, thus establishing full metric invariance for the PES and 
allowing subsequent invariance and rank-order stability testing. 
The final set of parameters for which invariance needed to be established before 




involved testing a model with equality constraints on the intercepts of corresponding 
items across time.  Unfortunately, this model resulted in a significantly worse fit than the 
metric invariance model described above, and the relatively small mean residuals for 
three items (Items 2, 3, and 4) indicated that these items may be exhibiting uniform DIF.  
That is, the items were equally representative of the factor across time (they were metric 
invariant), but their intercepts (item means when the factor equals zero) were 
systematically biased from one time point to the next.  Specifically, the mean for Item 4 
was overestimated at Time 1, whereas the means for Items 2 and 3 were underestimated.  
Recall that DIF occurs when extraneous variables, other than the construct of interest 
(psychological entitlement), are affecting the responses to non-invariant items.  Both non-
uniform and uniform DIF affect the responses but do so differently (i.e., when the DIF is 
non-uniform vs. when it is uniform).  With non-uniform DIF, the extraneous variables 
affect the relationship between the metric non-invariant item and the factor such that this 
relationship is stronger at one time point and weaker at another time point, thus resulting 
in different observed scores for the item with the same latent score across time.  With 
uniform DIF, the extraneous variables affect responses to the item such that that the 
extraneous variables systematically “bump” the intercept of a scalar non-invariant item at 
a given time point when the intercept (the item mean when the factor is zero) actually 
remains the same across time.  Given that only uniform DIF was present for three of the 
PES items, below I discuss several potential variables that may be responsible for the 
uniform DIF displayed by those three item (Items 2, 3, and 4).   
The first thing to notice regarding the three scalar non-invariant items is their 




the PES items, which either increase or remain roughly the same from Time 1 to Time 2, 
the means for two of the scalar non-invariant items (Items 2 and 3) decrease over time.  
Clearly, Items 2 and 3 show a different pattern of change over time compared to the rest 
of the PES items; thus, Items 2 and 3 do not reflect the small positive increase of PES 
scores across time (i.e., the means of Items 2 and 3 decrease over time).  This differential 
pattern of change could well be the key to uncovering the aforementioned possible 
extraneous variables affecting the responses for the three items displaying uniform DIF.   
By far the most plausible explanation for the systematic upward or downward bias 
in Items 2, 3, and 4 could be the wording of the items, coupled with the effect of 
maturation after 1.5 years of college.  That is, Item 2 (“Great things should come to me”) 
and Item 3 (“If I were on the Titanic, I would deserve to be on the first lifeboat!”) appear 
to be more extreme in nature and language than the rest of the items.  Thus, Items 2 and 3 
may have been endorsed more at Time 1 than the model predicted and less at Time 2 than 
the model predicted because of the expectations college freshmen typically have at the 
very beginning of their college career vs. later in their college career.  However, this 
attitudinal change only affected the responses to the two most extreme items (Items 2 and 
3).  That is, 1.5 years later students may not feel as “special” as they did when they were 
freshmen, and thus endorsed these two more extreme items less strongly at Time 2 vs. 
Time 1 relative to the endorsement of the other less extreme items at Time 2 vs. Time 1 
(which actually increased or remained approximately the same across time).  Thus, 
because of the extremeness of these two items and the perceived feeling of being special 




systematically biased across time (i.e., underestimated at Time 1 and overestimated at 
Time 2).   
A similar logic could be applied to the uniform DIF of Item 4 (“I demand the best 
because I am worth it”).  Unlike the rest of the PES items, Item 4 contains an explanatory 
clause as to why the respondent should endorse the item.  That is, the respondent must 
possess some sort of “worthiness” in order to “demand the best”.  Thus, Item 4 may be 
affected by the extraneous variable of deservingness.  When students completed the 
measure as incoming freshmen, they may have not perceived themselves as worthy of 
demanding the best, and thus did not endorse Item 4 very strongly.  However, after 1.5 
years of college, students likely experienced some hard work and/or struggle, and 
therefore agreed with Item 4 more strongly than would be expected based solely on their 
level of the latent construct psychological entitlement (an increase in the extraneous 
variable deservingness is causing this unexpected increase in the item mean across time). 
It is important to note that wording of the items combined with maturation of the 
students is one of many possibilities why Items 2, 3, and 4 are exhibiting uniform DIF.  
The fact that the bias among these items is bidirectional (i.e., positive for Item 4, but 
negative for Items 2 and 3 at Time 1) is interesting in and of itself, and so is its effect on 
the mean difference testing. Two things are important to note with respect to the 
bidirectional uniform DIF exhibited by Items 2, 3, and 4 and its effect on the mean 
difference analysis.  Recall that the test of latent mean difference was conducted in the 
full scalar invariance model (where all 9 items contributed to the factor mean) and also in 
a partial scalar invariance model (where only the six scalar invariant items contributed to 




scores was found when only the scalar invariant items contributed to the mean.  The 
reason for this greater effect is that, on average, latent scores tended to increase from 
Time 1 to Time 2, whereas the means for two of the non-invariant items (Items 2 and 3) 
decreased.  Because these two items would have contributed to the latent mean difference 
in the opposite direction of many of the other items, the latent mean difference when 
these non-invariant items did not contribute to the estimation of this difference was 
greater than if they contributed to the estimation of the latent mean difference.  The same 
effect of the bidirectional change in Items 2, 3, and 4 was present when observed means 
were analyzed.  In fact, the combined decrease in the observed means of Items 2 and 3 
from Time 1 to Time 2 equaled exactly the increase in the observed mean of Item 4 
across time.  This bidirectional change completely masked the effect of the scalar non-
invariant Items 2, 3, and 4, resulting in nearly the same observed mean difference (.02 vs. 
03) regardless of whether these items contributed to the total mean scores for Time 1 and 
Time 2.   
Fortunately, the uniform DIF discussed above was present only in three of the 
PES items, and the mean residuals were not very large considering the PES response 
scale.  If uniform DIF were present in more items and the mean residuals were large, 
neither the latent, nor the observed mean differences would have been meaningful.  On 
the one hand, when computing the latent mean difference test, only scalar invariant items 
contribute to the mean.  This may appear as a protection against the bias of scalar non-
invariant items on the factor mean, but if many of the items on a given measure are scalar 
non-invariant, the factor mean may no longer represent the construct well enough for any 




analyzed, the effects of large uniform DIF could seriously distort the results, and 
potentially lead the researcher to a wrong conclusion.  For example, an increase in 
observed scores from Time 1 to Time 2 could be attributed to the latent construct under 
investigation when the effect could be due simply to uniform DIF of a large number of 
items in the same direction.  In addition, it is important to note that uniform DIF can only 
be detected when some, not all, items display uniform DIF.  One would be unable to 
distinguish true change on the construct (alpha change) from the effects of an extraneous 
variable, if all items were equally affected by this extraneous variable. 
Implications for the PES and the Psychological Entitlement Domain  
The current study has several important implications for the domain of 
psychological entitlement and the use of the PES to measure psychological entitlement 
over time.  First, I empirically tested whether a widely used measure of psychological 
entitlement (PES; W. K. Campbell et al., 2004) displayed longitudinal measurement 
invariance. Assessing the invariance of the PES was important because often it is 
assumed that respondents conceptualize the construct the same way across time and that 
the measure functions the same way across time, when neither may be true.  Given that 
no prior research has studied the PES in terms of measurement invariance, the current 
study provided further construct validity evidence for the PES by establishing full 
configural, metric, and partial scalar invariance for the PES with practically insignificant 
bias of the three scalar non-invariance items over 1.5 years.  Thus, the PES can be used as 
a reliable measure of psychological entitlement in longitudinal research with college 




across time based on scores collected with the PES on such a sample has been 
empirically supported. 
After establishing measurement invariance for the PES, the stability of 
psychological entitlement was assessed by examination of both rank-order and mean-
level consistency over two time points.  It is essential to note that this is the first study to 
assess the stability of psychological entitlement over a long period of time (1.5 years).  In 
this regard, the study provides empirical support to previous anecdotal evidence that 
found, on average, entitlement to be relatively stable over time (e.g., W. K. Campbell et 
al., 2004).  Importantly, this study lends evidence that this is the case not only for short 
periods of time (e.g., one to two months) but also for longer periods of time (1.5 years). 
However, as mentioned previously, a construct‟s stability cannot be accurately and 
completely determined by examining only mean-level change or rank-order consistency.  
Both indicators need to be considered in assessing the presence of change.  This necessity 
was clearly illustrated in the case of psychological entitlement, in that no change was 
found on average, but individual change was present across time (as indicated by a 
moderate rank-order consistency coefficient).  Thus, only when both mean-level change 
and rank-order consistency are examined does one fully understand the type of change 
taking place and the extent to which the construct under study remains stable over time.  
Put simply, when assessing the change in psychological entitlement for college students, 
it appeared that psychological entitlement was stable over time based on the lack of 
change on average.  Examination of individual change, however, through the moderate 
rank-order consistency and especially by plotting the change trajectories for a sample of 




place among students.  Some students increased, others decreased, and still others 
retained approximately the same levels of psychological entitlement over 1.5 years.  This 
is a very important finding because it challenges the claims in the literature stating that 
psychological entitlement is stable over time, which categorizes the construct as a trait.  
The results discussed above, however, clearly indicate that while psychological 
entitlement may be stable on average, individuals change differentially on the construct 
over time. 
Related to this point, the current study opens a whole new arena for future 
research on the stability of entitlement.  If this finding is replicated, it would be 
interesting to examine possible explanations as to how and why levels of psychological 
entitlement change for some people but not for others.  That is, what predictors could be 
added to the model to explain why some students increase in psychological entitlement, 
whereas others decrease, or remain fairly consistent?  Moreover, why is it that over short 
periods of time (e.g., one and two months) test-retest consistency is high (.72 and .70; W. 
K. Campbell et al., 2004), but over long periods of time (1.5 years in the current study)  it 
is only moderate (.61).  Is psychological entitlement one of the individual differences that 
Fraley and Roberts (2005) and Veenhoven (1994) described as highly consistent over 
short periods of time but less stable over longer periods of time?  Obviously, answering 
this question would shed light on possible interventions to decrease entitlement. 
LMACS Analysis as a Unified Approach to Assessing Construct Stability 
Given the importance of empirically testing the assumption of measurement 
invariance in longitudinal research and the examination of both average and individual 




of LMACS analysis over more traditional approaches to assessing construct stability over 
two time points.  First, unlike traditional statistical techniques, such as t-test or ANOVA, 
which assume measurement invariance, I demonstrated how LMACS analysis allows the 
researcher to empirically test this assumption through the multi-step process of invariance 
testing.  As mentioned previously, establishing measurement invariance for a given 
instrument ensures that respondents conceptualize consistently the construct of interest 
across testing occasions and also that the instrument measures the construct the same way 
across time.  By testing for measurement invariance, the researcher collects evidence for 
the presence of these highly desired properties of scores in longitudinal research. 
Second, once measurement invariance is established, I demonstrated how 
LMACS analysis allows for the tests of stability to be conducted at the latent level.  
Conducting these tests at the latent level has several advantages, the most important being 
that a latent modeling approach may be a more appropriate method of modeling 
unobservable constructs.  This advantage is most apparent when analyzing items that are 
complex in nature (i.e., items representing multiple constructs).  If items are truly 
multidimensional, analyzing the data at the latent level allows the researcher to 
“disentangle” the variance due to the construct of interest from the variance due to other 
constructs that may or may not be of interest.  Analyzing multidimensional items using 
observed variable techniques would prevent the researcher from better understanding the 
structure of the scores and could lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the construct(s) 
of interest.  Alternatively, if the items are truly unidimensional, the data could easily be 
analyzed using observed variable techniques.  However, even with simple structure, 




accounts for both measurement error in the indicators and any systematic error variance 
in corresponding items across time, thus yielding more accurate parameter estimates and 
a more powerful analysis overall. 
Finally, LMACS analysis allows all of the analyses described above to be 
conducted within a single analytical framework.  Once configural and metric invariance 
have been established, the researcher can assess rank-order consistency by examination 
of the factor correlation across time, which is readily available in the output.  Similarly, 
once scalar invariance is established, one can compute and interpret the latent mean 
difference test using the latent means, variances and covariances across time from the 
output.  As such, LMACS analysis represents a convenient unified framework for 
conducting sound construct stability research with numerous advantages over traditional 






Regardless which method is used to scale the factor, conclusions regarding 
measurement invariance remain the same.  Different scaling methods offer different 
interpretation of parameter estimates, but model fit and latent mean difference effect size 
are the same across scaling methods (see Little et al., 2007). 
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Please respond to the following items using the number that best reflects your own 
beliefs. Please use the following 7-point scale: 
 
1 = strong disagreement. 
2 = moderate disagreement. 
3 = slight disagreement. 
4 = neither agreement nor disagreement. 
5 = slight agreement. 
6 = moderate agreement. 
7 = strong agreement. 
 
1. I honestly feel I‟m just more deserving than others. 
2. Great things should come to me. 
3. If I were on the Titanic, I would deserve to be on the first lifeboat! 
4. I demand the best because I‟m worth it. 
5. I do not necessarily deserve special treatment.  
6. I deserve more things in my life. 
7. People like me deserve an extra break now and then. 
8. Things should go my way. 
9. I feel entitled to more of everything. 
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Sample Size across Testing Occasions 
 Number of students 
administered  the 
PES 
Missing Data Complete  
Data 
Outliers 
Time 1 3749 35 3714 29 
Time 2 3346 33 3313 31 
Match    NA NA 2267 2195 
Note. Of the 3749 students tested at Time 1, only 2442 students (65%) were eligible to be 
tested at Time 2. In addition, 402 (12%) of the 3346 students tested at Time 2 were not 
tested at Time 1 because they were transfer students. Thus, the 2267 reflects only those 







 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for the PES Items at Time 1 and Time 2 
Item 1T1 2 T1 3 T1 4 T1 5 T1 6 T1 7 T1 8 T1 9 T1 1T2 2 T2 3 T2 4 T2 5 T2 6 T2 7 T2 8 T2 9 T2 
1T1 --                   
2T1 .526 --                 
3T1 .497 .493 --                
4T1 .435 .485 .525 --               
5T1 .228 .181 .261 .201 --              
6T1 .482 .477 .475 .497 .171 --             
7T1 .442 .417 .409 .364 .130 .550 --            
8T1 .451 .515 .458 .467 .164 .523 .563 --           
9T1 .566 .470 .570 .481 .277 .574 .533 .586 --          
1T2 .468 .344 .340 .300 .182 .345 .310 .336 .394 --         
2T2 .313 .479 .334 .340 .152 .357 .288 .373 .352 .584 --        
3T2 .295 .285 .451 .312 .172 .316 .249 .299 .352 .537 .519 --       
4T2 .259 .291 .310 .479 .130 .322 .239 .304 .289 .467 .532 .540 --      
5T2 .183 .137 .189 .133 .228 .160 .100 .135 .192 .297 .245 .312 .250 --     
6T2 .300 .328 .306 .294 .147 .439 .317 .339 .342 .502 .547 .491 .492 .226 --    
7T2 .290 .263 .276 .243 .152 .307 .416 .320 .312 .462 .432 .456 .401 .213 .585 --   
8T2 .288 .342 .283 .315 .126 .328 .301 .453 .348 .482 .574 .487 .518 .244 .581 .583 --  
9T2 .348 .292 .337 .269 .189 .345 .291 .348 .421 .611 .503 .578 .491 .355 .606 .549 .593 -- 
Mean 2.70 3.72 2.57 3.19 2.73 3.19 3.21 3.23 2.37 2.76 3.56 2.50 3.42 2.71 3.18 3.26 3.33 2.39 
SD 1.50 1.68 1.50 1.69 1.37 1.48 1.57 1.56 1.38 1.59 1.71 1.55 1.76 1.45 1.54 1.63 1.55 1.44 
Skewness 0.45 -0.11 0.73 0.29 0.85 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.71 0.48 0.04 0.83 0.19 0.85 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.81 
Kurtosis -0.82 -0.90 -0.11 -0.91 0.52 -0.80 -0.85 -0.80 -0.36 -0.81 -0.093 -0.06 -0.95 0.36 -0.69 -0.83 -0.69 -0.02 
Note. Responses range from 1 (strong disagreement) to 7 (strong agreement).  Item 5 (rs in bold) was reverse coded prior to these statistics being computed.  






Table 3  
Unstandardized (Standardized) Factor Pattern Coefficients, Error Variances, and 
Variance Explained for the 9 PES Items in the Independent One-factor CFA Models at 
Time 1 and Time 2 
 Pattern Coefficients Error Variance R
2 
Item Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
1 0.96 (.69) 1.15 (.72) 1.01 (.52) 1.21 (.48) .48 .52 
2 1.05 (.68) 1.23 (.72) 1.08 (.54) 1.40 (.48) .46 .52 
3 0.97 (.70) 1.10 (.71) 0.96 (.51) 1.19 (.50) .49 .50 
4 1.02 (.65) 1.18 (.67) 1.04 (.57) 1.72 (.55) .43 .45 
5 0.37 (.29) 0.53 (.37) 0.47 (.92) 1.75 (.86) .08 .14 
6 0.99 (.73) 1.16 (.75) 1.02 (.47) 1.04 (.44) .53 .56 
7 0.97 (.67) 1.11 (.68) 1.98 (.56) 1.41 (.53) .44 .47 
8 1.04 (.72) 1.17 (.75) 1.03 (.47) 1.05 (.43) .53 .57 
9 1.00 (.79) 1.14 (.79) 1.00 (.38) 0.78 (.38) .62 .62 
Note. All unstandardized pattern coefficients were statistically significant (p <.05) except 
Item 9 which was fixed to 1 and could not be tested for significance; standardized pattern 
coefficients are in parentheses; standardized error variances (proportion of variance in the 
indicator not explained by the factor) are in parentheses; R
2
 = proportion of variance in 






Fit Statistics for the Models Testing Measurement Invariance across Time 1 and Time 2 
Model ML
2
 df p-value Δχ
2
 Δdf Δp-value SRMR CFI RMSEA 
Configural Invariance 1055.24 125 < 0.001 -- -- -- 0.032 0.95 0.06 
Metric Invariance 1067.67 133 < 0.001 12.43 8 0.133 0.033 0.95 0.06 
Scalar Invariance 1172.71 141 < 0.001 105.04 8 < 0.001 0.033 0.95 0.06 
Equal Factor Means 1173.85 142 < 0.001 1.14 1 0.286 0.033 0.95 0.06 
Scalar Invariance—i4 free 1123.76 140 < 0.001 56.09 7 < 0.001 0.033 0.95 0.06 
Scalar Invariance—i2, i4 free 1091.64 139 < 0.001 23.97 6 0.001 0.033 0.95 0.06 
Scalar Invariance—i2, i3, i4 free 1078.15 138 < 0.001 10.48 5 0.063 0.033 0.95 0.06 
Equal Factor Means—i2, i3, i4 free 1081.01 139 < 0.001 2.86 1 0.091 0.033 0.95 0.06 
Note. Δχ
2
 = chi-square difference; Δdf = degrees of freedom difference; Δp-value = probability value for the Δχ
2
 test; SRMR = standardized root mean square 
residual; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation. The Δχ
2
 tests were conducted to compare more constrained models to 
less constrained models in order to establish invariance for a set of parameters: the metric invariance model was compared to the configural invariance model, all 
scalar invariance models were compared to the metric invariance model; Δχ
2
 tests were also conducted to test the latent mean difference for significance by 
comparing the fit of both of the equal factor means models to the fit of the scalar model directly above it. 










Mean Differences of Latent and Observed PES Scores Based on All vs. Only Scalar Invariant Items 
Latent Estimates All Items Only Invariant Items 
Latent mean difference  0.020 0.040 
Latent mean difference effect size 0.012 0.041 
Observed Estimates All Items Only Invariant Items 
Time 1 observed mean 2.991 2.906 
Time 2 observed mean 3.012 2.939 
Observed mean difference 0.022 0.034 
Observed mean difference effect size 0.021 0.032 
Note. Invariant items are Items 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Observed means range from 1 to 7. None of the mean differences were significant 
at p < .05. Latent mean difference effect size values indicate standard deviation units by which the latent mean at Time 2 is greater 
than that at Time 1, taking into account the correlation of scores across time.
2
 Observed mean difference effect size values indicate 
standard deviation units by which the observed mean at Time 2 is greater than that at Time 1, taking into account the correlation of 
scores across time.
3 










Figure 1. Rank-order consistency vs. mean consistency. The four scenarios above illustrate the results when crossing rank-order 









Figure 2. Configural invariance model with correlated factors at Time 1 and Time 2 and correlated error variances for pairs of items. 








Figure 3. Metric and scalar invariance model, assuming configural invariance. Corresponding factor pattern coefficients (λ) and 
intercepts (τ) for items from Time 1 and Time 2 are constrained to be equal, thus the lack of time subscripts. Latent means (κT1 and κT2) 








Figure 4. Individual change trajectories for a random sample of 105 participants (5%) from Time 1 to Time 2. The graph shows 
visually the differential change taking place at the individual level: some participants increase on entitlement, others decrease, and still 
others remain the same across time.  
8
5
 
